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Abstract
This paper presents a model of the New Economic Geography which
integrates commuting costs and land rent and displays a dispersion - ag-
glomeration con￿guration when regional and/or international trade are
liberalised. Two main results are found, the ￿rst one is that dispersion
Pareto dominates agglomeration, the second one is that the agglomeration
rent is not bell-shaped but strictly decreasing when impediments to trade
are removed. This turns out to be a convenient framework to revisit the
links between tax competition, location of ￿rms and trade integration. It
is shown in particular that trade liberalization only leads to a race to the
bottom in terms of taxation, and that a tax ￿ oor set at the level of the
small country may be detrimental to it.
JEL classi￿cation: H00; H87; F2; F12
Keywords: Economic geography; Cities; Trade; Tax competition.
1 Introduction
Economic geography models are ￿ lumpy￿by their very nature[...]. That
is, agglomeration forces can turn mobile factors into quasi-￿xed factors.
Agglomeration forces mean that spatial concentration of economic activi-
ties - including the activity of the mobile factor - creates forces that favour
further spatial concentration. Baldwin et al (2003,.p365-372)
The relationship between tax competition and integration has been at the
heart of many lively debates in the past and remains important, controversial
and puzzling.
It is important because the entry of ten new members in the European Union
(EU) promises challenges for both old and new members. These challenges seem
scary to some countries of the old EU because integration might imply delocal-
ization of some activities and unemployment of the less skilled workers. Hence,
￿The author thanks Marc Fleurbaey and Frederic Robert-Nicoud for discussions and com-
ments, all the participants in the Vth spring school in economic geography and particularly
Pierre-Philippe Combes and Thierry Mayer for suggestions, the European Commission (Marie
Curie fellowship) for ￿nancial support and the University College Dublin where this paper was
written, the author is particularly grateful to Frank Barry and Peter Neary.
1to retain activities a decrease in the taxation on the mobile base might be a
solution, but if this decrease is copied, and thus degenerates into a race to the
bottom, then the resources of the "welfare state" might be reduced and the
situation of unskilled workers could be even worse. Besides, the relationship
between tax competition and integration is controversial because while the pre-
vious fears are supported by the conclusions of the Neoclassical Tax Competition
Models (NTCM), the New Economic Geography (NEG) tends to prove the re-
verse. Indeed, NTCM ￿nds a positive correlation between integration and race
to the bottom in terms of taxations, which leads to an underprovision of the
public good. On the other hand the NEG shows that before this race to the bot-
tom occurs the agglomeration of activities generates a rent for the mobile factor
that increases with the freeness of trade, so that the government which hosts
this core of activities can increase its taxation without capital ￿ ight. Lastly the
link between tax competition and globalization is puzzling because empirical
evidence de￿es easy explanation : the e⁄ect of taxation on the choice of locali-
sation seems to be very di¢ cult to determine and dependent on the geographical
level of analysis, on the choice of the mobile base and on the calculation of the
tax burden. For instance, Quinn (1997) ￿nds that ￿nancial liberalization and
corporate taxation are positively linked in 64 countries, and furthermore, by us-
ing a panel regression for 17 industrialized countries, Swank (1998) also rejects
the conclusion of a race to the bottom. But on the other hand, by using another
proxy of corporate taxation, Rodrik (1997) and Bretschger and Hettich (2002)
show that economic integration has a negative impact on capital taxes1. By
performing a meta-analysis, de Mooij and Ederveen (2001) demonstrate that
the di⁄erences between 25 studies come from di⁄erences in the type of capi-
tal data or in the tax rates adopted. The result of their analysis is that one
point reduction in tax rate increases FDI by 3.3%. On a regional scale, the
impact of international trade liberalization on local capital taxes seems to be
even more di¢ cult to obtain. Of course, there are some exceptions : Kirchg￿ss-
ner and Pommerehne (1996), for instance, ￿nd that if a race to the bottom in
Switzerland appears to be a reality, no evidence of underprovision of the public
good is found, which permits them to conclude that "if tax competition works
well in Switzerland, there is no reason why it should have disastrous e⁄ects in
a future European Union". However this result has not been generalized to
other countries, for which the literature simply shows that tax policy is copied
among neighboring jurisdictions (see Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), and Revelli
(2001) who ￿nd tax mimicking respectively among Belgian municipalities and
UK juridictions).
To resolve the empirical puzzle, more work on the theorical link between
tax competition and trade liberalization seems necessary. The present paper
analyzes this link on the theoretical ground of the NEG. Antecedents in this ￿eld
are relatively numerous (Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman
(2004), Borck et Pl￿ger (2005), Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000),
1They used the e⁄ective average tax rate on capital. In order to understand the di⁄erences
between these tax rates see Devereux et al. (2002) for de￿nitions and stylised facts about the
e⁄ective average and marginal tax rates and Carey et al. (2000) for the implicit tax rates.
2Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2002)) and, as we have already said, the common
point of almost all of them is that, while agglomeration generates in a ￿rst step
of integration an increasing rent for the mobile factor, this rent later decreases,
which implies that before the race to the bottom, a race to the top occurs for
intermediate levels of transaction costs. But does this bell-shaped con￿guration
of the agglomeration rent, which is the heart and soul of conclusions when it
comes to tax competition, always occur with trade liberalization?
As it turns out, this bell-shaped con￿guration appears to be speci￿c and
does not have a clear economic justi￿cation2. What we want to show here,
is that in an urban economic model, the lumpiness mentioned in the opening
quote is somewhat diluted when trade gets freer. And this dilution, which has
some justi￿cations like an increase in commuting costs and/or in land rent, with
the coming of new residents, changes the outlook of tax competition matters.
More precisely, by asking the same question as Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
that is : "What is the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on tax competition in case
of agglomeration?", we are going to show that governments who play a Stack-
elberg game are going to launch a race to the bottom when trade liberalization
increases. This research is in accordance with the recent discussion concerning
the future of the New Economic Geography made by Fujita and Mori (2005,
p17) who point out that the Baldwin and Krugman (2004) model is central be-
cause it has set up a link between urban economics, which assigns an important
role to city government and the NEG, which neglects such an entity. However,
as they underline, "the next step would be to graft various urban features (such
as land and housing markets, commuting, transportation networks and other
urban infrastructure) onto geographical models with local governments".
Such an attempt is going to be made in three stages. The ￿rst one presents
the economic geography model, while the second displays its basic results and
lastly, the third step integrates tax competition in the analysis.
2 Krugman and Livas Elizondo￿ s model revis-
ited
2.1 Space pattern
This model is based on Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996). There are three
regions in this model, two monocentric cities and the rest of the world. Further-
more labour is the only factor of production. Entrepreneurs, (denoted h, h￿,
h￿ in the North, South and rest of the world), own this labour and are mobile
between cities, but not between cities and the rest of the world. The wage in the
2The agglomeration rent exists in this model because agglomerative and dispersive forces
do not decrease at the same rate when trade gets freer and because each of their decreasing
rate is not constant. However, as Baldwin et al. (2003, p30) has pointed out ￿the reason
why dispersion forces erode faster than agglomeration forces is somewhat involved and cannot
really be illustrated fully without resorting to equations￿and concerning the apex of the bell,
they note in footnote 21 p 36 ￿we have not been able to justify this result intuitively￿.
3latter is taken as the numØraire. Moreover entrepreneurs are also mobile inside
the city. Each of them owns one land unit and they are spread along a line, but
as all ￿rms are located in the middle of this line (called the Central Business
District (CBD)) they need to commute. These commuting costs have a direct
impact on the labour force that entrepreneurs supply in the CBD. As each of
them owns one labour unit, the total amount supplied by an entrepreneur who
lives on the fringe of the city in the North, at location x (the CBD being at
location 0 by convention) is :
s(x) = (1 ￿ 2￿ j x j) (1)
where ￿ (with ￿ < 1) is entrepreneurs￿level of commuting costs. Furthermore,
as the number of entrepreneurs is h, entrepreneurs￿maximal distance from the
CBD is h





s(x)dx = h(1 ￿ ￿h=2) (2)
As land rent on both edges of the segments is normalized to zero, if w is
entrepreneurs￿ wages near the CBD, then the wage net of commuting costs
earned on both edges is:
s(h=2)w = s(￿h=2)w = (1 ￿ ￿h)w (3)
Because consumers are identical in terms of preference and income, in equi-
librium they must reach the same utility level, so that entrepreneurs who live
on the fringe of the segment receive a net wage of only (1 ￿ ￿h)w, but pay
no land rent. On the contrary entrepreneurs who lives near the CBD do not
pay signi￿cant commuting costs, but the price of the services yielded by land is
higher at this location. In other words, the increase in real wage near central






Figure 1: Land rent
In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the net wage in the city, while the
horizontal axis shows the size of this city. Because each entrepreneur owns one
land unit, this size only depends on their number. Moving from the suburb to
the CBD implies a decrease in commuting and therefore an increase in net wage,
but also an equivalent increase in the land rent which equalizes utility among
individuals. In other words, the following condition must be veri￿ed:
s(x) ￿ R(x) = (1 ￿ ￿h)w
where s(x) is the total amount supplied by an entrepreneur who lives on the
fringe of the CBD, R(x) is the land rent prevailing at x, while the right term
represents the wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges given by eq.(3).
By using expressions (1) into this system we ￿nd the following land rent:
R(x) = ￿(h ￿ 2 j x j)w with x 2 (￿1=2;1=2)





While on the one hand Tabuchi (1998) assumes that there are absentee
landlords, and on the other hand, Helpman (1998) assumes that the aggregate
land rent is owned at global level, here Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996)
suppose that each entrepreneur owns an equal share of the ALR where they







5We can now turn to consumers￿behavior.
2.2 Consumers￿behavior
All consumers share the same utility function and consume one industrial good,
composite of di⁄erent varieties:










where M is the consumption of a manufactures aggregate, N is the large number
of potential varieties and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among these
varieties. All the nominal income (denoted E) is spent on manufactures. The
budget constraint is then given by:







which is a decreasing function of the number of varieties produced N (because
1 ￿ ￿ < 0). pi is the price of a typical variety i. The impact of N on the price
index is in￿ uenced by the elasticity of substitution. The more di⁄erentiated the
product varieties, the greater the reduction in the price index. The maximization










where (1 ￿ ￿
2h) comes from the income of land ownership (￿hw=2) and from
the wage net of commuting costs ((1 ￿ ￿h)w). From that and the price index
expression we can see that an increase in the number of industrial products
depresses the demand for each variety.
We can now turn to ￿rms￿behavior.
2.3 Firms￿behavior
The production of a typical variety involves a ￿xed cost, f, and a constant
marginal cost, a, giving rise to economies of scale. The labor force required to
produce this variety is then equal to:
L = f + aq (10)
Because each ￿rm produces a distinct variety, the number of ￿rms is also the
number of varieties consumed. Thus each ￿rm is a monopolist on the production
6of its varieties, and faces the demand function (8). But a key feature of the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition is that ￿rms ignore the e⁄ects of their action
on income y, and on the price index P. Hence the demand curve as perceived
by a typical ￿rm is not (8), but rather:
q = bp￿￿
where b = ￿Y=P1￿￿ is considered as a constant by each ￿rm. According to this






Because there is free entry, pro￿ts are always equal to zero, which, using





In equilibrium, a typical ￿rm employs f+a￿ q units of industrial entrepreneurs,
so that the total demand is n(f + a￿ q), and using the level of output (12) and
the fact that the total supply of labour is exactly L, the equalization gives the





The number of varieties produced is then proportional to the number of
entrepreneurs.
2.4 Transaction costs
So far, the model has almost been described as a closed economy. The next
step is to relax this assumption, trade occurring between the North, the South
(denoted by *), and the rest of the world (denoted by ￿). Industrial varieties
are exchanged between countries under transaction costs which take the form of
iceberg costs: if an industrial variety produced in the Northern market is sold
at price p on it, then the delivered price (c.i.f) of that variety in the South (in
the rest of the world) is going to be ￿p (￿￿p) with ￿;￿￿ > 1.
The assumption of iceberg costs implies that ￿rms charge the same producer
price in both regions, the distance does not imply ￿ discrimination￿ , and ￿ mill
pricing￿is optimal. The ￿rst-order conditions for a typical ￿rm￿ s sales to its









p￿ = ￿￿ aw￿
￿ ￿ 1
(16)
7Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) we assume that the input-output coe¢ cient
is equal to the reverse of the mark-up. This normalization simpli￿es prices which
are equal to wages weighted by transaction costs (see (14)). Furthermore the
sum of the population (North+South) is normalized to one: h + h￿ = 1:
Iceberg transaction costs also imply a modi￿cation of the price index (7).
By using the above normalization we ￿nd:
P1￿￿ = n￿￿
￿(w￿)1￿￿ + nw1￿￿ + ￿n￿(w￿)1￿￿ (17)
(P￿)1￿￿ = n￿￿
￿(w￿)1￿￿ + ￿nw1￿￿ + n￿(w￿)1￿￿ (18)





￿ represents a degree of trade freeness: ￿
￿ = (￿￿)1￿￿;￿ = (￿)1￿￿
and ￿
￿ = (￿￿)1￿￿
The price index in the North and in the South decreases with the size of the
external market, and with international trade liberalization. Furthermore, at
the symmetric equilibrium where wages are the same in North and South, an
increase in n and a decrease in n￿ implies, as long as there are transaction costs
(￿ < 1), an increase in price index in the South and a decrease in price index
in the North.
We now need to integrate transaction costs into the demand function.









Ceteris paribus, the demand in the North is an increasing function of the
income Y ￿, and a decreasing function of the price index P￿. Obviously the
higher the international trade liberalization, ￿
￿, the higher the impact of the
rest of the world on the northern demand. But considering the second and third
terms we can notice that two opposite e⁄ects come from cities￿size, indeed we
have just seen that an increase in the population in the North decreases P and
thus increases P1￿￿ and increases P￿ and thus decreases (P￿)1￿￿, then South-
North migration fosters a decrease in the total demand q in the North (if ￿ < 1).
But what is the e⁄ect of a modi￿cation of location on income? A glance at the
following equations will give an answer:
Y ￿ = L￿w￿ (21)
Y = h(1 ￿ ￿h=2)w (22)
Y ￿ = h￿(1 ￿ ￿h￿=2)w￿ (23)
An increase in h in the North, and thus a decrease in the South increases expen-
diture in this country and lowers it abroad, which causes as long as impediment
to trade exists (￿ < 1), an increase in demand q.
82.5 Market clearing condition and long term analysis.
Thanks to these equations, we can now present the market clearing in a tidy
form through an equalization of demand (eq.(20)) to supply (eq.(12)), prices are








Unfortunately, nominal wages cannot be obtained analytically since on the
Right Hand Side (RHS) of the market clearing equation wages depend on ￿ and
moreover on the Left Hand Side (LHS), price indices also involve wages which
are dependent on 1 ￿ ￿. However it is possible to investigate the relationships
between price indices and wages by linearizing the model around the symetric
equilibrium (when h = h￿ = 1=2). Indeed, at the symetric equilibrium, a mod-
i￿cation of one variable in one region is associated with an equal modi￿cation




w￿ = b w an so on, we get the following expression by way of
a log di⁄erentiation of price indices and wages:
b P = Z￿(
Z￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
b h + b w) (25)








where Z￿ can be considered as an inverse measure of trade freeness, there is
autarky when Z = 1 and free trade for Z = 0 (Z￿ 2 [0;1]) and Z￿ is an inverse
measure of commuting costs, there is no commuting cost when Z￿ = 1 and very
high commuting costs when Z￿ = 2
3 (Z￿ 2 [2
3;1]).
Concerning the ￿rst expression (25), if we consider that entrepreneurs￿sup-
ply of labor is perfectly elastic, b w = 0, then an increase in the number of entre-
preneurs in the North, b h, implies a decrease in the price index in this country.
This e⁄ect is known as the local competition e⁄ect or as the market crowding
e⁄ect. Concerning the second expression (26), we can eliminate b P by using (25),

















thus by considering once again that entrepreneurs￿labor supply is perfectly






Hence one percent change in the northern demand for manufactures, b Y , in-
creases entrepreneurs￿employment, b h, by 1
Z￿Z￿(> 1) percent in the North. The
9novelty is that here this home market e⁄ect is reduced by commuting costs.
Furthermore we can observe that an increase of b h increases b Y , indeed by log
di⁄erentiating the equation of income (21) we know that:
b Y = Z￿b h + b w
Then one percent change in the entrepreneurs￿ employment in the North, b Y ,
increases the northern demand by 1
Z￿ percent in the North (with b w = 0). Thus
the larger manufacturing sector has a more than proportionally larger home
market. Moreover we have just seen that the larger home market has a more
than proportionally larger manufacturing sector, this is the backward linkage
also called the demand-linked circular causality. Notice that this backward
linkage decreases with commuting costs.
To sum up, two opposite forces drive relative nominal wages, on the one
hand an increase of entrepreneurs in one city exacerbates local competition
among ￿rms, thus new entry triggers a slump in the price index, and thereby
in operating pro￿ts too, so that in order to stay in the market ￿rms need to
remunerate their workers less (market crowding e⁄ect). But on the other hand,
as the income generated by the new entrepreneurs is spent locally, sales and
operating pro￿ts increase and under the ￿ zero pro￿t condition￿this implies a
higher nominal wage (the home market e⁄ect). However, entrepreneurs do not
consider the relative nominal wage when they decide to migrate but the relative
real wage. Hence in the long run migration stops when real wages are equalized
in case of symmetry (h = 1
2), or when agglomeration in one city generates a
higher relative real wage. Thus by denoting ￿(h;￿;￿
￿) this relative real wage,

















we will have a stable total agglomeration in the North if ￿(1;￿;￿
￿) > 1, and a
stable dispersed equilibrium if d￿(1=2;￿;￿
￿)=dh < 0. Notice that in the long
run (eq.(30)) two additional forces appear, on the one hand the term (1￿￿h=2),
which enters multiplicatively in the indirect utility, creates a dispersive force
independently of transaction costs, which is the land market crowding e⁄ect,
and on the other hand the third term P￿=P which is an agglomerative force.
Indeed, we know that goods are cheaper in a central place because imports are
lower and thus the burden of transaction costs too. Hence, the entrepreneurs￿
purchasing power is higher in this location which attracts other entrepreneurs,
this is the cost-linked circular causality also known as forward linkage.
103 Intermediate results
3.1 Critical points
3.1.1 When is the Core-Periphery pattern sustainable?
The sustain point is the critical point of trade liberalization below which the
Core-Periphery pattern is sustainable. To determine whether the agglomeration
in the North is a stable equilibrium we need to know whether a small deviation of
entrepreneurs from h = 1 increases welfare or not. If it does, the Core-Periphery
pattern is not a stable equilibrium.
In the special case of autarky (￿
￿ = 0), the sustain point is very easily found,






Thus the relative indirect utility is given by:
￿(1;￿;￿
￿) = ￿
(2￿￿1)=￿(1￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿=2) (33)
which gives the following proposition:





2￿￿1 . Furthermore an increase in congestion costs (￿) and/or in the
elasticity of substitution between varieties (￿) decreases the level of regional
integration at which the agglomeration is a stable equilibrium
Proof. From eq.(33) we have:
￿(1;￿;￿







￿) > 1 for ￿ < ￿s
Furthermore it is clear from ￿










This proposition has ￿rst been formulated by Krugman and Livas Elizondo
(1996) and represents a new feature in the landscape of the NEG. Nevertheless,
as these authors have pointed out, this sustain point is ￿a special case￿ , and
says nothing about what happens when the assumption of autarky with the rest
of the world is relaxed. In fact, the introduction of the rest of the world implies
a particular problem for the calculation of this critical point because price index
11and wages are no longer linked by a simple expression as in equations (31) and



















This expression precludes the above simpli￿cation of the analysis. What we
propose here is a calculation of this critical point by assuming that the rest of
the world is as big as the total population in the North and South3, in other
words h￿ = h + h￿ = 1. This normalization implies that w = 1 is a solution of
the agglomerative equilibrium, which permits to ￿nd the relative price index in


















These two equations imply that the ratio of indirect utilities has the following
form:
￿(1;￿;￿








which gives the following proposition:





2￿￿1 (1 + ￿
￿) ￿ ￿
￿. Furthermore international trade liberalization de-
creases the level of regional integration at which the agglomeration is a stable
equilibrium.
Proof. From eq.(38) we have:
￿(1;￿;￿













￿ = (1 ￿
￿
2
)￿(￿￿1)=(2￿￿1) ￿ 1 < 0 because ￿ < 1
3Three arguments can be put forward in order to justify this: ￿rst we work with monocen-
tric cities, for those small cities the rest of world is often limited to the nearest big city, thus
assuming that the latter entity is as large as the sum of the whole monocentric population
is quite realistic. In fact if we consider that the big city is the ￿rst rank city, and monocen-
tric cities are second-largest, our assumption follows Zipf￿ s law at the dispersive equilibrium.
Secondly this assumption is useful because it allows us to make an analysis in terms of ex-
ternal costs. Thirdly, this assumption is going to be relaxed in the next sections in order to
understand more precisely how an increase in the world population could a⁄ect the equilibria.
12After the sustain point, we can now turn to the break point.
3.1.2 When is the symmetric equilibrium broken?
The break point is the critical point of transaction costs above which a dispersive
equilibrium is broken. Suppose that entrepreneurs are equally dispersed among
regions, then in order to determine whether this situation is an equilibrium we
need to know if a small deviation increases welfare or not. If it does, dispersion is
not an equilibrium. Thus we want to know the sign of d￿(1=2;￿)=dh. Appendix















where wage and price are given in the appendix.
From the previous section we know that wage and price index are respec-
tively decreasing and increasing with the size of the rest of the world and with
international trade liberalization. This higher wage and smaller price index
tend to decrease Z￿ which fosters the dispersive equilibrium (in the appendix
we show that
d V (1=2;￿)
b h < 0 when Z￿ < Zb
￿). Moreover an increase in commuting
costs tends to break the agglomeration incentive. This can be summarized by
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An increase in the importance of the rest of the world (￿
￿, L￿),
or of commuting costs (￿), decreases the level of regional trade liberalization at
which the dispersive equilibrium is broken.
A similar proposition has been found by Fujita et al. (1999); yet they do
not ￿nd the same break point because their model di⁄ers by integrating ad-hoc
congestion costs instead of the explicit treatment of land rent carried out here.
3.2 Bifurcation diagram
In order to get a full understanding of how the size of regions globally changes
with trade liberalization, we make numerical simulations4 and get the so-called
￿ tomahawk diagram￿ . This diagram plots the location of entrepreneurs as a
function of regional transaction costs.
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Figure 2: The tomahawk diagram
Three steps of trade liberalization are remarkable in Figure 2 : in the ￿rst
step of trade liberalization regions are in relative autarky, ￿ < ￿b demand and
cost linkage play an important role and all activities are localized in one of the
two regions, agglomeration is then the only stable equilibrium. Indeed if we
plot the welfare in each region as a function of the number of entrepreneurs in
the North, as in Figure 3, we clearly see that once a small deviation of entre-
preneurs from the dispersive equilibrium occurs, further agglomeration is in the
agents￿interest because the relative indirect utility in the Core increases. Thus
entrepreneurs decide to migrate because the relative welfare increases with their
movement. However, if we compare their welfare at the symetric equilibrium (in
A) and at the agglomerated equilibrium (in B or C), we can observe that they
are worse o⁄ in this last situation. This simulation gives the following result:
Proposition 4 Dispersion Pareto dominates agglomeration
This result is new and comes from the substitution of the immobile factor as
the dispersive force with entrepreneurs￿need to commute. Indeed on the con-
trary, in the Krugman (1991) model agglomeration Pareto dominates dispersion
for entrepreneurs (this is proposition 3 of Charlot et al. (2004)). Here things are
di⁄erent, entrepreneurs prefer dispersion because this equilibrium allows them
to reduce the burden of urban costs. However, due to the non linearity of the
model, we cannot prove such a result for all ￿
￿. Nevertheless we can prove that:
Proposition 5 If regions are in autarky with the rest of the world, ￿
￿ = 0,
then whatever the level of regional transaction costs ￿, dispersion is a Pareto
improvement for entrepreneurs.
14Proof. In autarky ￿
￿ = 0, and at the dispersed equilibrium, h = 1
2 price index
are given by:
P1￿￿ = nw1￿￿(1 + ￿) (39)
thus, by replacing n by L




















When all entrepreneurs are agglomerated in the North, h = 1, the price index







with this, entrepreneurs￿ indirect utility when they are agglomerated is given by:

























, ￿ > Z￿
￿ ￿ 1
since Z￿ 2 [2
3;1] (see (27)), the inequality ￿ > Z￿
￿ ￿1 is always veri￿ed, then
entrepreneurs prefer dispersion for all ￿.
This proposition can be considered as complementary to Murata and Thisse


















Figure 3: High trade costs
Coming back to Figure 2, we can see that in a second step of trade lib-
eralization, between the break and sustain point, both the agglomeration and
dispersion equilibria are stable. Indeed in Figure 4 at the dispersive equilibrium
a small deviation from the South to the North makes the indirect utility higher
in the South than in the North, thus entrepreneurs prefer to come back to the
southern city. The dispersive equilibrium is stable in such a case. However if
the migration shock is higher (h > 0:86), then they are strictly better o⁄ in the


















Figure 4: Intermediate trade costs
The third step, characterized by strong trade liberalization ￿ > ￿s, displays
an equal spread of activities among regions. Indeed in Figure 5 any deviations




















Figure 5: Low trade costs
One of the most interesting features is that these two sorts of equilibrium -
corner solutions in case of agglomeration, and an interior solution for location
dispersion - are also displayed by Krugman (1991)￿ s CP model, but not for
the same transaction cost values. Indeed, in comparison with the initial Core-
Periphery model, where dispersion appears before agglomeration, the situation
is reversed here, but the symmetry between the two models does not come from
a symmetric mechanism. Indeed, if everything was just reversed, the bell-shaped
agglomeration rent, instead of being found near free-trade, would be obtained
near autarky. The conclusion of race to the top for low transaction costs would
then be found for high trade costs, and so on. But here the agglomeration rent
is not bell-shaped.
3.3 Agglomeration rent
Previous steps have shown that agglomeration forces are stronger when the rest
of the world is relatively small and trade relatively restricted, the agglomeration
rent is then the highest in this case, ceteris paribus entrepreneurs strictly prefer
to be located in the North. The question is to know how this rent is in￿ uenced
by trade liberalization between regions. The agglomeration rent is given by
(38):
￿(1;￿;￿







which clearly gives the following result:
Proposition 6 Starting from a situation of agglomeration, an increase in trade
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if ￿ 6= 1 and ￿ 6= 1
In case of prohibitive costs between regions (￿;￿
￿ ! 0), the agglomeration
rent tends to in￿nity, in case of free trade (￿ ! 1) this rent only depends
on congestion costs. From a public policy point of view this decrease in the
agglomeration rent is particularly interesting and very intuitive indeed as in
the CP model, wage and price index in the North are constant, while P￿1￿￿
strictly decreases with ￿, thus the di⁄erence between the two models comes from
entrepreneurs￿wage in the South, in our model, this wage is strictly increasing
in ￿ because a decrease in transaction costs allows one to have better access
to the varieties produced in the Core. The real wage in the South is thus
an increasing function of trade liberalization and because the reverse of this
real wage determines the shape of the rent, this model displays a decreasing
agglomeration rent. In order to see how this rent varies with the size of the
external market we make some simulations5. In Figure 6, the horizontal axis































Figure 6: Agglomeration rent and growth of the rest of the world
In Figure 6 we can see that the population￿ s growth in the rest of the world,
h￿, decreases entrepreneurs￿agglomeration rent. Indeed, when h￿ is high, the
5Parameters take the values: ￿￿ = 1; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1; h = 1
18economy is outward oriented, the North is still the more attractive location on
account of its larger market. However the backward linkage is weaker since a
high proportion of ￿rms￿sales are now directed to the rest of the world. When
international trade costs decrease it almost identical to meeting this demand
from anywhere, then the agglomeration rent decreases.
4 Race to the bottom
In this section we want to analyze the tax policies between governments in the
case of a total agglomeration of activities, so we henceforth limit ourselves to
￿ < ￿b. Preferences are given by:
U = MG
where G is the supply of local public goods. With Andersson and Forslid (2003),
we assume that public goods are produced via private goods. Thus the com-
position of demand and all the variables that we have analyzed so far (wages
and prices) are not a⁄ected by the tax. We assume that each jurisdiction sup-
plies the same amount of public goods but the ￿nancing of these goods f and
f￿ can di⁄er from one juridiction to the next (implicitly the e¢ ciency of each
government can be di⁄erent6):
f = tY; f￿ = t￿Y ￿
Because the supply of public goods is the same everywhere, migration stops
when post-tax reward is higher in the Core. The location equilibrium condition




1 ￿ t￿ ￿ 1
Besides, we assume that governments maximize the following objective func-
tions:
W = W(f;t); Wf > 0
As has been pointed out by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), denoted BK for
short, the common point between the Leviathan and a benevolent government
is that their objective functions rise with the collected revenue and decline with
the tax rate, however because the tax rate also has an impact on the revenue,
a shift in it, ￿rst has a positive e⁄ect on the objective and then a negative
one. Thus, the objective function needs to be a bell-shaped curve when the tax
rate increases. This characteristic is veri￿ed here for the Core but not for the
Periphery since f￿ = 0 (because there are no entrepreneurs in the Periphery),
therefore the objective function in this country is negative and decreasing with
the tax rate. This can be interpreted by the fact that the South has a higher
6Another explanation of these equations and of the ￿ no delocation condition￿ has been
proposed by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), they assume that the supply of public goods can
di⁄er from one jurisdiction to the next but that entrepreneurs do not take this di⁄erence into
account when they decide to move.
19predator behavior than the North7. The local governments play a Stackelberg
game, the sequence of this game is the following:
1. The North sets a tax rate t
2. The South reacts through a tax rate t￿
3. Migration occurs
This game is resolved by backward induction. The third stage is already
known by the previous analysis of the model. Concerning the second stage,
whatever the decision of the Core concerning the level of taxation, the Periphery
has almost always an incentive to steal all the activities, at most it can be
indi⁄erent. Figure 7 illustrates this. The vertical axis represents the objective
function of the South, while the horizontal axis plots the level of taxation in
this country.
There are two possible situations, if the South does not succeed in stealing
the Core, then its revenue is going to be null, and its objective function is neg-
ative, on the contrary, if this country succeeds in attracting all the activities,
then its revenue is going to be equal to t￿Y ￿, and its objective function be-
comes bell-shaped. Total agglomeration in the North depends therefore on the
potential taxation levied by the South. The Northern government can indeed
be upset by a tax t￿
b, which enables the South to break the Core equilibrium:
t￿
b = 1 ￿ ￿(1;￿)(1 ￿ t) (40)
This break-point tax rate rises with t and falls with ￿(1;￿).
7We can imagine, for instance, that it is marginally more interesting for a small country
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Figure 7: The tax game
Thus if we start from a situation where the Core/North sets a high tax rate,
say t
00
, then the break-point tax rate, denoted t
00￿
b on the diagram is also high,
and thus the South can steal the Core by setting t￿ equal to t
00￿
b . If the North
decides to choose a lower level of taxes, say t
0
, then in such a case the South
can steal the Core by lowering t￿ to t
0￿
b . However in such a case t
0￿
b is equal to
zero, and thus equivalent to the tax rate that maximizes the objective function
of the South without the Core, namely t￿
u, thus the South is indi⁄erent between
the Core or the Periphery. Therefore, in the ￿rst stage, if the North wants to
keep the Core, it needs to set a tax below or equal to t
0
, such that the South
does not want to deviate from t￿
u = t
0￿
b . This limit tax rate, denoted te, is thus
equal to t
0
on the diagram and analytically found by:











We now need to verify that the North always prefers to have the Core. This
is demonstrated by the fact that the North wins We with the Core and nothing
without, accordingly the North will always "limit tax" the South.
214.1 Equilibrium tax gap
From the previous analysis we already know that the tax gap te ￿ tu is strictly
decreasing with trade liberalization. Indeed, with tb and tu equal to zero, the
tax gap only depends on te which decreases when ￿(1;￿) decreases, and it has
been found in proposition 7 that ￿(1;￿) decreases with ￿ and ￿
￿, thus this gives
the following proposition:
Proposition 7 International trade liberalization as well as regional trade inte-



















and we know from proposition 7 that
@￿(1;￿)




@￿￿ < 0; similarly from
the same proposition
@￿(1;￿)





4.2 Comparison of models and observations on tax har-
monisation
This model has the same characteristics as BK￿ s model, for instance the lumpi-
ness of the two models makes it impossible to rely on a simultaneous-move Nash
tax game. Indeed, if the North considers the South￿ s rate as given, it will want
to deviate in order to attain Wo in Figure 7, but if the North does so, then the
South will ￿nd it interesting to steal the Core. In other words reaction functions
are discontinuous. But this model also shares some features with the Basic Tax
Competition Model (BTCM). As in the Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)
analysis of "asymmetric tax competition", the big country can set a higher tax
rate than the small one without losing activities. Obviously assumptions be-
hind these results are di⁄erent, in their models8 the large country tends to set
a higher tax rate than the small one since the elasticity of capital is smaller for
them, whereas in the NEG models, the advantage of the Core is to supply an
agglomeration rent. In our model, this agglomeration rent is strictly decreasing,
which allows us to reach the same conclusion as the BTCM about a race to the
bottom. This result is obtained in a model with agglomeration forces where the
central parameter is not the degree of capital mobility, but the level of trade
costs. Thus, if Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) or Wilson (1986) conclude that
moving from no mobility of capital to perfect mobility leads to an underprovi-
sion of public goods, with BK we ￿nd that this underprovision concerns only
the big country, indeed, when entrepreneurs are not mobile, each government
8The argument is close to the Kennan and Riezman (1988) model where the large country
can manipulate the terms of trade.
22sets its unconstrained tax rate, and thus when mobility turns up, the North
needs to decrease its taxation level (in Figure 7 from to to te) in order to retain
the Core, but the South keeps the same level t￿
u. Concerning tax hamonisation,
we also share one of the two proposition made by BK: a common tax rate is
not Pareto improving. Indeed, if this tax is set below te, then the North is
clearly worse o⁄, and if a common tax is set over te, then the tax harmonization
becomes detrimental to the South since its objective function becomes negative.
Concerning the proposition made by BK about a weakly Pareto improvement
brought by a southern tax ￿ oor Figure 8 displays a comparison with the current
model.
* t
W (core in North)
W* (core in North in the






















Figure 8: Tax ￿ oor scheme for the Periphery
In the BK case, there are two tax payers, entrepreneurs and immobile work-
ers, thus the objective function in the Periphery is an inversed U-curve of t￿,
even if there are no entrepreneurs in this country because the government gets
revenue from the immobile workers. The unconstraint tax in the Periphery,
t￿BK
u , is thus positive, and a tax ￿ oor set at this southern tax rate relaxes a
part of the northern constraint, which can attain the welfare WBK
u by increasing
23its tax to tBK
u . However, because the traditional literature on tax competition
often tests what happens when a complete set of tax instruments is not avail-
able (Wellisch (2000) for an overview), we may wonder whether BK￿ s conclusion
holds when the tax-game only concerns the mobile factor. This is the case ana-
lyzed by Borck and P￿ ￿ger (2005), BP for short, but these authors have failed
to account for tax harmonization and this section can thus be understood as
complementary to their work. Alternatively we can understand the BK model
as an analysis of tax harmonization between countries, while our model concerns
tax harmonisation between cities or regions. Indeed in the BK model, only a
part of the population is mobile, which is really veri￿ed at international level,
while in our model all the population is free to migrate, which is also a good
approximation of what happens at a thinner spatial scale. In such a case the
objective function in the Periphery becomes negative, then t￿BK
b and t￿BK
u drop
toward zero and tBK
e also decreases, then a tax ￿ oor is no longer a good policy
as in the BK model, on the opposite :
Proposition 8 If all the population is free to migrate (or if the tax-game only
concerns the mobile factor), then a positive tax ￿oor set for the Periphery is
detrimental to this region.
That result is strong, since the whole population is never totally mobile,
however it indicates that if a positive tax ￿ oor is set, then this ￿ oor needs to be
revised and lowered if agents￿ mobility increases.
5 Conclusion
In the tax competition literature of the New Economic Geography, agglomera-
tion generates a rent that is bell-shaped with respect to trade liberalization, and
as a direct implication when trade between nations starts to be liberalized, the
Core can increase its tax rate without losing activities. In this literature, the
hump-shaped agglomeration rent comes from the dispersive force consisting of
the demand of immobile farmers. As has been pointed out by Helpman (1998,
p54) this "centrifugal force [...] is particularly suitable for societies in which
agriculture plays a major role, and in which farmers are tied to their land", but
alternative modellings are also relevant, as it has been underlined by CavailhŁs
et al. (2004) 40% of the income of American households is spent on housing
and transportation and a similar percentage can be found for the average of the
15 European Union member states (Winqvist (1999))9, then urban costs repre-
sent a signi￿cant feature of developped societies. As a result, we have chosen
to analyse a model that emphasizes commuting costs as a dispersive force. We
have proved that dispersion Pareto dominates agglomeration, which is quite a
common view among urban economists (Tolley and Crih￿eld (1987)), and we
9In the particular case of France, and by using the INSEE housing survey, CavailhŁs et
al. report that rent which reprensented 27% of income in 1984, has rosen to 70% in 1996.
Furthermore, by introducing their measure of commuting costs they show that the budget
share of transport communication and rent is e⁄ectively around 40% in 1996.
24have shown that the agglomeration rent stricly decreases with regional and in-
ternational trade liberalization. Then, if the Core can set a higher tax rate than
the Periphery without tax-base loss, this tax must converge toward that of its
adversary when trade is liberalized. Actually, the conclusions of the basic tax
competition models also tends to be veri￿ed in a lumpy world, tax competition
leads regions to a race to the bottom and there is an underprovision of public
goods in the larger region. Lastly, and even if our model is much ￿tter to de-
scribe the regional level, it is tempting to link its conclusions concerning the zero
tax rate set by the Periphery to the 0% tax rate set by Estonia on retained earn-
ings. This model also warns about the possibility of setting a tax ￿ oor for the
smaller region. Indeed if this is done without taking into account individuals￿
mobility then this ￿ oor can be too high and harmful to the Periphery.
Appendix A. The break point








(b L + (1 ￿ ￿)b w) (42)









































We insert (43) into (41), and rewrite (41) and (42) as the following system:
￿
￿ ￿ Z￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Z￿
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(1 ￿ Z￿)￿ (46)
with ￿ = (1 ￿ Z￿)[￿ + Z￿(￿ ￿ 1)](1 ￿ ￿) (47)
From eq.(2) we know:




By inserting this into the previous system (45) (46), and by using this equa-




















Clearly when Z￿ = 0, any deviation from the dispersive equilibrium has a












< 0 , Z￿ <
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
(￿ ￿ 1)2￿ ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)(4 ￿ 2￿)




(￿ ￿ 1)2￿ ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)(4 ￿ 2￿)
Furthermore Z￿ is a decreasing function of ￿, thus:
Z￿ < Zb
￿ , ￿ > ￿b
The dispersive equilibrium is therefore stable when ￿ > ￿b.
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